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RECENT BOOKS
CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY: A
SURVEY OF RECENT BOOKS
BARD R. FERRALL*
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION
LORAINE
GELSTHORPE
& NICOLA
PADFIELD,
EXERCISING
DISCRETION: DECISION-MAKING IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE DECISION AND

BEYOND (Devon, Willan Publishing, 2003) 228 pp.
Recent legislative enactments in England have sought to limit the exercise of
discretion by decision-makers in the criminal justice system. The editors have
concluded that empirical description of actual use of discretion is necessary to
evaluate whether too much or too little discretion is allowed, or is otherwise
misallocated. In order to examine the exercise of discretion by decision-makers, the
editors have collected essays which study the exercise of discretion at several specific
points in the system. These essays evaluate the following: whether to prosecute
juveniles; what level sentence to impose, or whether to impose some type of sentence
other than confinement; the competing penological theories motivating such
decisions; whether to apply prison rules, or whether to refrain from applying the rules
in order for prison officials to retain authority and security while negotiating
cooperation from the confined population; board decisions in granting parole to life
sentenced prisoners and the weighing of factors in calculating the risk to society of
releasing the prisoner; the decision whether to send a convict to, and later whether to
release a convict from, psychiatric care (where the decision is complicated not just by
the calculation of risk, but also by practical concerns such as limited hospital space);
and the decision whether to confine asylum seekers.
A concluding essay discusses the problems discovered by the other contributors in
attempting to establish order and rationality in the criminal justice decision process by
constraining the exercise of discretion through rules and enacted procedures. Though
not formally recognized as such, discretion is exercised throughout the system.
Decisions about a case are made at various stages; earlier decisions affect how
discretion can be exercised in later stages. For example, the recommendations made
* Reference Librarian, Northwestern University School of Law Library; M.A., University
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or the information to include in a report or record, significantly affects later
dispositions. Rules cannot completely control these decisions. Moreover, persons not
formally recognized as decision-makers often make these decisions. The process is
not merely linear: earlier discretion may be exercised in anticipation of later decisions.
For example, recommendations may be influenced by expectations of what will be
adopted or rejected. The concept of a "serial" rather than a linear process of criminal
justice decision-making has important implications. In a "serial" process of decisionmaking, power is dispersed throughout the system, and decisions made at one point
can shape or severely restrict the choices available at a later point. The "case" is not
discrete and unchanging, but is formed at various overlapping stages in the system.
Criminal justice officials to whom formal discretionary authority is not allocated by
the enacted procedures may in fact exercise important discretion. The decision, for
example, whether to label an incident an "offense" or a "dispute," or even whether to
bring the matter into the system at all, may profoundly affect the final outcome.
Decisions made at the point where the rules formally allocate discretionary power
may largely be the ratification of earlier decisions. Thus, discretion in the criminal
justice system may be exercised in many places other than where enacted procedures
and rules would seem to place it. Moreover, discretion is exercised in the context of
many other surrounding concerns. The application of specific rules to the factors
intrinsic to the specific case may only partially explain why a particular decision was
reached.
The frameworks within which individual decision-makers interpret
information also affect the exercise of discretion. The same information framed
differently can lead to different decisions. Researching the criminal justice decision
process requires a better tuned method than correlating "factor" and result, because
understanding the impact of the individual factor requires understanding how the
decision-maker "framed" the factor. Formulating the rules that will provide consistent
practice of criminal justice requires further understanding of how discretion is
exercised.

JUVENILES
MARGARET K. ROSENHEIM,

FRANKLIN

E. ZIMRING, DAVID S.

TANENHAUS, & BERNARDINE DOHRN EDS., A CENTURY OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2002) 554 pp.
Surveying the century after Illinois enacted legislation establishing the first court
system devoted to juveniles, these essays examine topics of historical perspective,
legal theory, social science as related to juvenile justice policy, other child welfare
institutions and their links to the juvenile justice system, and comparative studies of
juvenile systems around the world. Specific topics include: the changing and
complicated attitudes toward children in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries;
the experiments that led to the transformation of the first juvenile court to the present
system; the various methods and institutions developed over the century for confining
juveniles; the emergence of legal conceptions of childhood; the reformulation of
juvenile justice jurisprudence after Gault's requirement of procedural regularity in the
juvenile courts and the need to divert juveniles from the hc-rms of adult criminal
punishment; the development, in the last half of the century, of a juvenile "status
offense" (i.e., actions normally legal but defined as offenses when the offender is
juvenile); the relationship of social science research and juvenile justice
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administration; interactions between public schools and the juvenile system, and the
failure to bring the two institutions into a positive alliance; and studies of juvenile
systems in Japan, England and Europe.

SENTENCING
GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA
BARGAINING IN AMERICA (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2003) 397

PP.
The American criminal justice system has become predominantly a plea bargaining
institution. The author seeks to explain this phenomenon by using chronological
studies of the rise of plea bargaining and by examining why plea bargaining operates
in the interest of the relevant actors: prosecutors, defendants and sentencing judges.
Other studies tracing the statistical rise of plea bargaining have explained it in terms
of case load pressure, prosecutors' need for efficiency, the development of police
science which, in some views, make a trial unnecessary, or in terms of other social
factors. The author takes a court-centered approach and investigates the source of the
power to plea bargain. The prosecutor and defendant may both have incentives to
plea bargain, but the author argues that plea bargaining only becomes systematic with
the participation of the sentencing judge. The author follows earlier studies indicating
that plea bargaining began in the early nineteenth century with prosecutions for
violations of liquor laws. Although the liquor laws assigned a fixed fine to each level
of violation, the prosecutor could charge the defendant with an offense matching the
facts or she could offer to bring a lower charge in exchange for a guilty plea. Plea
bargaining also developed in capital cases where prosecutors offered to bring noncapital charges in exchange for a guilty plea. The incentive for defendants to plea
bargain grew in the middle of the nineteenth century when changes in procedure
permitted the defendant to testify to her own innocence at trial (previously the
defendant was not permitted to testify at all). The Public Defender's Office further
contributed to the rise of plea bargaining: public defenders, coping with heavy case
loads, found it preferable to devote their scarce resources to a full trial only where the
defendant was most likely innocent. Docket pressure also encouraged the judiciary to
exercise its sentencing power in favor of plea bargaining. However, the author argues
that it was the rise of personal injury suits later in the century that crowded the docket
and made it in the interest of the judge to quickly dispose of criminal cases. The use
of "on-file" sentencing (putting cases on file and staying sentences unless the
defendant committed another crime), which eventually became known as probation,
furthered the use of plea bargaining. The innovation of indeterminate sentencing may
have undermined the dominance of plea bargaining by moving some of the sentencing
power from the judiciary to the parole board. The author, however, finds that case
load pressure has also forced parole boards to cooperate with the institution of plea
bargaining. The rejection of virtually every innovation that might have reduced the
power of plea bargaining demonstrates its dominance.. The Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, and similar trends in the states that legislatively mandated sentencing
levels for each offense, furthered plea bargaining's dominance in much the same
manner as the liquor laws. However, by removing the sentencing power from the trial
judiciary to the legislature, the Guidelines shifted the plea bargaining power from the
judge to the prosecutor.
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THEORY
STEPHEN SHUTE & A.P. SIMESTER, CRIMINAL
DOCTRINES OF THE GENERAL PART (Oxford, Oxford

LAW

THEORY:

University Press,

2002) 332 pp.
Although the distinction is not always clear, as the editors discuss, theories about the
special part of criminal law are contingent on the elements of particular offenses,
while theories about the general part of criminal law are concerned with the criminal
law enterprise in general. Analysis of problems arising from particular offenses, such
as whether justifications or excuses should be available to battered women who kill
their abusers when not immediately or imminently threatened, may be assisted by
reference to general theories of criminal law and its purpose. Contributors to this
volume consider whether certain applications of criminal justice can be criticized on
the basis of general criminal law theory. Issues discussed include: the development of
an individualized objective standard; problems arising from the general requirements
of voluntariness, intent, knowledge or belief; the growing number of defined offenses;
the intensification of punishment and whether these developments exceed the
purposes of and justifications for criminalization; the specific act requirement and the
imposition of criminal liability for some instances of omission, failure to act, or
recklessness; confinement of persons not on the basis of a specific act but on a
determination of dangerousness; whether criminal law should be used to regulate
behavior not morally blameworthy; and whether courts should accept actions which
violate defined offenses (such as entrapment by law enforcement officers) but which
may promote legal purposes. The authors also discuss the failure to define the
interrelationship of the purposes of criminal law and the resulting conflict among the
purposes and the exercise of undisclosed discretion by law enforcement officials.

